Where were you in the census, Daddy?

Census time is almost here again. What once felt to most of us as a friendly, community activity, even a chance to leave a tiny mark on the page of history. But in the context of the inexorable growth of surveillance systems and methodologies, it increasingly looks a little sinister.

The revelation that the upcoming binge will be handled by a branch of Lockheed Martin can only add to the disquiet. Lockheed Martin builds cluster bombs, mostly known for killing children, and the F16 warplanes that played a central role in the recent destruction of Gaza. They also provide interrogators to Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and Guantånamo in Cuba.

More relevant to their projected role in the census, they are involved in surveillance and data management for the CIA and FBI.

We can take it that any government assurances about our data being completely safe, although it will be handled by this company whose major source of income from all sides is the War On Fright, are so much hot air.

Expect a boycott campaign to take flight in the next few days. If you miss out on filling in the 32-page questionnaire by accident or omission as many do, it’s overlooked by Big Brother.

But this time may be the time to go public. It may cost each of us a grand in court, but it’s a rare chance to make democracy come alive.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zkq9hdGSsXQ&feature=player_embedded

More info about this at http://stopwar.org.uk - soon

Surveillance: Guidelines are not enough

Lib Dems demand curbs on 'spying'

Councils have been criticised for using CCTV/phone tapping powers to tackle dog mess.
The Lib Dems want tighter controls on surveillance powers for authorities including councils and the police, adding that only a magistrate should be able to approve a request for surveillance, under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (Ripa).

More than 500,000 requests to access phone and e-mail records were made in 2008, according to the Interception of Communications Commissioner. The Home Office said the powers should be used only when "proportionate".

An average of about 1,500 surveillance requests were made every day in Britain in 2008, according to figures which have emerged from an annual report by commissioner Sir Paul Kennedy.

That is the annual equivalent to one in every 78 adults being targeted.

Although slightly down on 2007, the total number of requests last year was up by more than 40% on 2006, and it included 1,500 approved applications from local councils.

The government forgets that George Orwell's 1984 was a warning, and not a blueprint

Lib Dem home affairs spokesman Chris Huhne said the figures "beggared belief".
"Many of these operations carried out by the police and security services are necessary, but the sheer numbers are daunting," he said.

"It cannot be a justified response to the problems we face in this country that the state is spying on half a million people a year. We have sleepwalked into a surveillance state, but without adequate safeguards. Having the Home Secretary in charge of authorisation is like asking the fox to guard the hen house. The government forgets that George Orwell's 1984 was a warning and not a blueprint."

Local authorities in England are still spying on suspected minor offenders despite being banned from doing so by law. Since 2003 they have only been able to use undercover methods against those suspected of breaking criminal law, but the chief surveillance commissioner said it was of "significant concern" that some local authorities were going beyond what was allowed. He was especially worked up about the use of CCTV to monitor people.

In his annual report for 2008, published on 21st July, Sir Christopher Rose raised concerns about "directed surveillance" - such as bugging of a public place or taking photographs of suspects - and the use of covert human intelligence, such as informants and undercover officers.
He mentioned "a continuing failure on the part of authorising officers properly to demonstrate that less intrusive methods have been considered and why they have been discounted in favour of the tactic selected. If, for whatever reason, the government does not wish public authorities to use powers conferred by Parliament, the proper course, it seems to me, is for Parliament to remove those powers."

Authorising officers are senior officials in local authorities, government departments and other public bodies who sign off surveillance requests under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA).

Surveillance by local authorities is not yet allowed to be intrusive, such as bugging of phone lines or entering premises.

In England /Wales it is restricted to suspected breaches of criminal law and should not be used to investigate suspected tax dodgers, for example, or on economic or public safety grounds.

Such exemptions do not apply in Scotland.

Sir Christopher warns that public bodies such as local authorities need to stick more closely to the rules.

He says: "A specific act of surveillance may not be intrusive but a combination of acts may enable the construction of a profile; this requires careful consideration when judging whether an individual's private life is subject to interference."

He added that authorising officers sometimes do not understand the need to gain specific authorisation to target people in a public place.

"It is not where the CCTV is placed (which may be overt or covert) but the manner in which the camera is used that is determinative of whether the surveillance is covert," the report says.

And he adds: "CCTV operators employed by local authorities are required to pass rigorous examination for the use of this controversial equipment, yet it appears that some police officers operate CCTV without obvious qualification."

Obviously, merely setting out guidelines is not good enough; there has to be a way of regulating this, and local bodies that overdo it must be accountable in law.

Having operated a CCTV camera myself, as a security guard, I'm aware of the traps. If something looks interesting you will close-in and follow it. That may be nothing more than a beautiful pair of legs. But legs belonging to a woman who has not signed any contract before becoming an unwitting performer. And a crowd of people - any crowd, may be suspect.

On the international level, the operators of remote-control armed drones take this to its extreme, by applying a 'rule of thumb' and just 'taking them out'. That is why it's dangerous to have a wedding celebration in Afghanistan. If you think this jump in context is fanciful, don't forget that Merseyside police began using (unarmed) drones in 2007.

see also: http://hanleyexpress.blogspot.com/2009/06/ripa-council-snooping-is-growth.html

Nokia profits from Iranian surveillance, UK next?

Rory Cellan-Jones, Technology correspondent at BBC News, has reported on the latest moves by the Iranian State to curb dissent:

'As protests continue in Iran, details are emerging of the technology used to monitor its citizens.
Iran is well known for filtering the net, but the government has moved to do the same for mobile phones.
Nokia Siemens Network has confirmed it supplied Iran with the technology needed to monitor, control, and read local telephone calls.
It told the BBC that it sold a product called the Monitoring Centre to Iran Telecom in the second half of 2008.
[ Nokia provides what it calls 'next generation' network 'solution' for Cellcom Israel. Although on Nokia's website map, Palestine is clearly not included as part of Europe, 'Israel' is defined as being in south-west Europe]

Data inspection
Nokia Siemens, a joint venture between the Finnish and German companies, supplied the system to Iran through its Intelligent Solutions business, which [in turn] was sold in March 2009 to Perusa Partners Fund 1LP, a German investment firm.
The product allows authorities to monitor any communications across a network, including voice calls, text messaging, instant messages, and web traffic, but Nokia Siemens says the product is only being used, in Iran, for the monitoring of local telephone calls on fixed and mobile lines.
Rather than just block traffic, it is understood that the monitoring system can also interrogate data to see what information is being passed back and forth.
A spokesman described the system as "a standard architecture that the world's governments use for lawful intercept".
Iran is also struggling to compete with an opposition that call on the skills of one of the world's most vibrant blogging communities and plenty of tech-savvy folks.'

It's here already
He added: "Western governments, including the UK, don't allow you to build networks without having this functionality."
One useful source of information about the watchers is The Open Net Initiative (ONI).
The ONI is a collaborative partnership of four leading academic institutions: the University of Toronto, Harvard University, Cambridge University and Oxford University. It recognises Israel as a legitimate state, although it places it in the Middle East rather than Europe. Here are pieces of their research into the possibilities of state surveillance on the net:
Political Blocking
There are no examples in Europe of filtering carried out to silence political opposition such as those that the Open Net Initiative has documented in other regions. There are, however, examples of filtering that seeks to maintain the legitimacy of government institutions and preserve national identity. In December 2002 a local Swiss magistrate, Françoise Dessaux, ordered several Swiss ISPs to block access to three Web sites hosted in the United States that were strongly critical of Swiss courts, and to modify their DNS-servers to block the domain appel-au-people.org. The Swiss Internet User Group and the Swiss Network Operators Group protested that the blocks could easily be bypassed and that the move was contrary to the Swiss constitution, which guarantees “the right to receive information freely, to gather it from generally accessible sources and to disseminate it” to every person. However, there was strong enforcement, as the directors of noncompliant ISPs were asked to appear personally in court, failing which they faced charges of disobedience.

In their current form, defamation laws at the country level, particularly in Britain, have been criticized for leading to a “Web takedown” culture where ISPs immediately remove content that is allegedly defamatory when brought to their notice, for fear of facing law suits. The concern in Britain, as in other nations, is that this can have a “chilling effect” on lawful online content and behaviour.

For up-to-date information on this, see http://opennet.net/research/regions/europe
see also: http://hanleyexpress.blogspot.com/2009/08/surveillance-guidelines-are-not-enough.html
...and here's a word from our sponsor:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gNvHl9Uy1Nw